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ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN IMPLEMENTING NON-
REGULATORY CODES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SMES 
LISTED IN THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET IN THE UK: 
A CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Anil Chandrakumara*, Gunetilleke Walter** 
Abstract 
This study explores roles of NEDs of SMEs listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the 
London Stock Exchange. It extends the literature on NEDs' roles relevant to a context where the 
adherence to the principles of non-regularity corporate governance is not compulsory. We adopted a 
content analysis approach as a novel method for exploring roles of NEDs using details of 1220 NEDs 
recorded in 75 annual reports. It revealed that NEDs meet the expectations of several stakeholders 
simultaneously by playing multiple roles. A conceptual model depicting testable relationship between 
cognitive tasks and key roles of NEDs is also developed. 
Keywords: Roles of NEDs, SMEs, Content Analysis, Corporate Governance in AIM Companies, Role 
Theory 
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1 Introduction 
The separation of ownership and management in listed 
companies demands the appointment of the Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) into the board of directors 
to align the interests of the managers and the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). However, 
corporate governance problems such as expropriation of 
assets of the shareholders by managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), excessive salary increases for CEOs and 
other executives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005), 
expenditure on decoration of office complexes and 
luxury facilities (Berle and Means, 1933) etc. are some 
of the sources of conflicts of interests between the 
shareholders and the managers. Although these 
conflicts have been documented as relevant to large 
scale and public limited liability firms, they might be 
generally applicable for any small or medium firms 
(SMEs) listed in the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) (e.g. Chris and Kean, 2010; Gunatilake and 
Chandrakumara, 2012). The negligence of duties 
towards a number of other stakeholders such as debtors 
and suppliers has also been noted by a number of other 
researchers (e.g. Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Helland and Sykuta, 2005; Belden, 
Fister and Knapp, 2005). Essentially, these issues are 
associated with roles ofNEDs directors (Maseda et al., 
2014) and codes on corporate governance. 
With regard to empirical research on the roles of 
NEDs in SMEs, a number of related issues have also 
been reported. First, research on roles of NEDs in 
SMEs has not received adequate and continuous 
attention (e.g. Seiascia et al., 2013; Voordeckers et a!., 
2007) and they have largely been taken only when there 
are corporate collapses (Jones and Pollit, 2003; Sevic, 
2005). Second, the topic of corporate governance role in 
SMEs is relatively recent (Gnan et al., 2013; Al-Najjar, 
2014) and largely under researched, and remains poorly 
theorized (Seiascia et a!., 20 13; Pye and Pettigrew; 
2005, Collier, 2004). Third, the role of NEDs in SMEs 
has not been examined in the context where the 
implementation of NRCCGA is not compulsory. As 
such, this paper aims at filling the knowledge gap in 
understanding the role of NEDs of SMEs listed in the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the London 
Stock Exchange with specific reference to voluntary 
codes on corporate governance. Specifically, this study 
examines (a) what are the roles played by NEDs of 
SMEs in AIM listed companies in the UK? (b) What 
characteristics ofNEDs' roles of these companies could 
be identified through content analysis? and, (c) Is there 
any relationship between different roles played by 
NEDs of AIM companies? 
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The AIM has grown in many aspects since its 
launch in 1995 to date, which includes an increase in 
number of the UK and international companies to 861 
and 226 respectively and in equity capital from a mere 
£82 million to £80,592 million(AIM, 2014). However, 
there is a dearth of research on the AIM listed 
companies. For example, we have found only two 
papers which discuss some aspects of the corporate life 
of these companies and with the use the phrase 
'Alternative Investment Market' within the title of their 
papers (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998; Parsa and Kouchy, 
2008; Alessandra, 2010). Further, NEDs in SMEs play 
such critical roles as advising, formulating strategies, 
supervising day to day operations, paying marketing 
visits to foreign firms etc. (e.g. Deakins, O'Neill and 
Milliken, 2000; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Long, 
Dulewicz and Gay, 2005; Minichilli and Hansen, 2007). 
However, the role of NEDs with regard to voluntary 
application of the UK's Code on Corporate Governance 
by the AIM listed firms has not been paid much 
attention. This may be due to the fact that those SMEs 
that are new to listing might consider that some of the 
provisions are disproportionate or less relevant in their 
cases or some of the provisions do not apply for 
companies below the FTSE 350 (Financial Times Stock 
Exchange -350). Given these realities, such SMEs may 
consider that it might be appropriate for them to adopt 
the approach outlined in the Code as they are 
encouraged to do so (FRC, 2012). As such, this study is 
aimed at contributing to the knowledge in 
understanding the role of NEDs of SMEs in 
implementing the NRCCG by the AIM listed 
companies in the UK. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Introduction to the 
study is followed by a brief review of literature on the 
role of NEDs and role theories. Research methodology 
with the adoption of content analysis is presented in 
detail in the second section of the paper. The 
presentation of results and discussion of finding is 
presented next. Finally, we conclude the paper with our 
contribution to the knowledge on the role of NEDs of 
SMEs listed in AIM in London stock exchange with a 
direction for further research. 
2 Literaure review 
The role of the directors of public limited liability 
companies in the UK is explained broadly in sections 
171 to 177 in the Companies Act of 2006 as (i) to serve 
the company within the powers, (ii) promotion of the 
business and (iii) exercise judgment and exercise 
reasonable care. The Corporate Governance Code 
(FRC, 2012) in the UK explains the role of the NEDs as 
follows: 
'Non-executive directors should scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed 
goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance. They should satisfY themselves on 
the integrity of financial information and that 
financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible. They are 
responsible for determining appropriate levels of 
remuneration of executive directors and have a 
prime role in appointing and, where necessary, 
removing executive directors, and in succession 
planning' (FRC, 2012, p.10). 
Within the unitary board system in the UK, 
executive directors as well as the NEDs take joint 
decisions and bind them all for the decisions taken 
(Davies, 2003; Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). A unitary 
board system or any other board system such as the 
two-tier system of boards exists in countries such as 
Germany and Japan (Vives, 2000), members in the 
board could have many differences in terms of the age, 
qualifications, experience and so on. A number of 
authors note the importance of a mixed bag of cognitive 
tasks such as right perception, positive beliefs, 
assumptions and attributions necessary to create a 
successful board (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; 
Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006). 
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001), NEDs are 
required to execute three roles: monitoring the 
managers, setting the strategic frame, and the service. 
However, they argue that 'the strategic role is said to be 
the defining role of the board and given the term 
'director' means playing an important part in 
determining organization's effectiveness' (Styles and 
Taylor, 2001, p.27). Because ofthe significanct nature 
of these roles, a board is explained as the apex of the 
firm's decision control system by Fama and Jensen 
(1983a). Many authors also agree on the fact that the 
NEDs perform a vital function in securing vital 
resources for the SMEs such as the markets, 
technology, financial institutions and so on (Neilsen and 
Rao, 1987; Burt, 1997). In general, Mintzberg (1983) 
identified seven roles of the NEDs: (1) selecting the 
CEO; (2) exercising direct control during periods of 
criSis; (3) reviewing managerial decisions and 
performance; (4) co-opting external influencers; (5) 
establishing contacts and raising funds; (6) enhancing 
the organisation's reputation and (7) giving advice to 
the organisation. 
In addition, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) 
emphasise the need to create accountability within the 
board by the NEDs in making an effective dialogue at 
the board meetings. Accordingly, NEDs could be 
effective if only they pay their attention at the board 
meetings in challenging and questioning appropriately 
about the assumptions of the managers while supporting 
them. They caution that the NEDs must understand 
, "" 
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about their non-executive function and must have an 
incremental approach with a mindset of an 'experienced 
ignorance' which they term as ' ... just by asking the 
idiot-boy questions' (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 
2005, p.14). Useem (2003) also note that corporate 
failure could be avoided with probing and challenging 
the assumptions of the managers. A synthesis of several 
arguments cited above has been brought under a 
concept of "corporate directing" by Pye (2002), which 
covers governing, strategizing and leading. Corporate 
directing includes, 'more than just board behaviour, but 
all aspects of directors' communications, both explicit 
and implicit as well as inside and outside their 
organisation in the process of shaping their 
organisation's future' (Pye,2002, P.155). 
3 Theories on roles 
According to the above analysis, the role of the board is 
complex and it has to deal with a multitude of tasks 
other than the monitoring and controlling proposed by 
the agency theorists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). As such, the approach of this paper 
is to use the Role Theory (Sarbin and Allen, 1968) as 
the guiding framework to analyse the role of NEDs. In 
role theory, a role is never defined by itself. It is 
defined in relation to other possible tasks - mother and 
father in relation to daughter and son, merchant in 
relation to customer and artisan, etc., 'which can be 
designated as counter positions. . . . a role frame' 
(Connell, 1979, p.11 ). These counter positions or 'role 
senders' (Rogers and Molnar, 1976:598) represent a 
number of parties. Shareholders (Koehn and Ueng, 
2005; Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom, 2006), 
employees (Clapham and Cooper, 2005), and debtors 
(Day and Taylor, 1998) are the major role senders or 
the stakeholders. These stakeholders have the decision 
making power to offer rewards if their expectations are 
met, otherwise the use of punishments such as the 
removal of the directors from the positions may occur 
(Connell, 1979). 
According to these theoretical arguments, if the 
expectations of the stakeholders could be identified, it 
could be possible to list out the tasks to be performed 
by the NEDs, disregarding the fact that job contract of 
NEDs could be incomplete due to many other factors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Due to the large number and a wide 
variety of stakeholders (Stenberg, 1997) and the 
difficulty of understanding the relative importance of 
each stakeholder (Friedman and Miles, 2002), writing 
the job contract for the NEDs is challenging and a 
difficult task. While the Principal-Agent Theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, (1976) explains that 
shareholders expect the principals to maximise their 
interests mainly the return on capital, Huse (2005) 
argues that there are altruists also among the 
shareholders who do not necessarily expect 
maximisation of return for their investments. Huse 
(2005) argues that investors expect their investments to 
generate some social benefits too such as environmental 
protection, social equity and so on. Given these 
theoretical positions and arguments, what is identifiable 
is the difficulty of getting a clear idea about the desired 
roles of NEDs, which provides the theoretical basis for 
adopting the content analysis of annual reports of 
companies listed in the AIM. 
4 Methodology 
We adopted content analysis as a method of data 
collection form companied listed in the AIM. It is based 
on the analysis of annual reports of companies to be 
selected. Corporate annual reports are widely used in 
content analysis in accounting research such as 
disclosures and social reporting (e.g., Milne and Adler, 
1999; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Beattie, Mcinnes and 
Fearnley, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006). Research evidence also 
indicates that a number of other disciplines such as 
communication through internet web sites (Perry and 
Bodkin, 2000; Jun and Cai, 2001); management 
research (Jauch, Osborn and Martin, 1980), marketing 
(Harris and Attour, 2000), Business Ethics (Bell and 
Bryman, 2007) and Political Science (Hart, Jarvis and 
Lim, 2002) have also benefitted from the content 
analysis research method. Alsaeed's (2006) analysis of 
the relationship between the disclosure level and the 
appointment of the NEDs was also based on the content 
analysis. To the best of our knowledge on roles of 
NEDs, no studies can be found with the adoption of 
content analysis method using annual reports of 
companies. 
4,1 Unit of analysis 
Milne and Adler (1999) point out that a sentence of a 
text is reliable than a word and page in a document for 
content analysis. However, the decision on the selection 
of the unit of analysis has to be taken in the context of 
the research and the type of the document (Weber, 
1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). Stiles 
(2001, p.634) notes that 'sentences that contain 
reference to board's involvement in strategy was 
analysed and key verbs or qualifiers were highlighted to 
ascertain the mode of involvement'. For the proposed 
study, we also selected the sentence as the unit of 
analysis. 
4.2 Stability, reliability and validity 
Kassarjian (1977, p.8) notes that content analysis is a 
research technique for the 'objective, systematic and 
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quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication' and that three properties should be 
achieved by a content analyst, namely; stability, 
reliability and validity. 
According to Kassarj ian (1977), the stability can 
be achieved if the coding of a document is done in the 
same way after a period of two weeks, and if the same 
codes are given for the document coded. Reliability is 
the degree of confidence a reader could develop in his 
or her mind about the results of the content analysis. In 
order to ensure reliability, there are many steps to 
follow in the content analysis. 
Several steps are taken to ensure reliability: (1) 
preparation of the coding instrument; for the coding of 
annual reports; (2) theoretical framework to develop the 
coding instrument, (3) establishment of coding decision 
rules. These steps could ensure the protection of two 
properties in content analysis (Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 
2002; Krippendorff, 2004), i.e. mutual exclusiveness 
and mutual exhaustiveness. Mutual exclusiveness 
means that a sentence could fall only into a single 
category and mutual exhaustiveness means that all the 
sentences in the selected 'locations' (Milne and Adler, 
1999) in an annual report are paid the attention of the 
coder (Weber, 1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 
2004). Denscombe (2003) points out that constant 
comparison by going backward and upward in the 
document could ensure the above two properties. 
Validity means the categories established in the 
content analysis have the property of explaining the 
particular phenomena that is meant for the analysis. 
Validity consists of two components namely internal 
validity and external validity. If the categories 
established through the coding process are backed by 
the theory, internal validity is ensured. For example, 
category of strategy, advice and monitoring and so on 
are found as tasks of the NEDs (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). Any conceptual term not familiar with the 
researcher is required to be considered as unique at the 
open coding stage (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). However, 
in order to ensure complete understanding of such 
conceptual terms or what Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
explain as theoretical saturation or theoretical 
sensitivity (Ahuvia, 200 I). Such conceptual terms 
found in the open coding stage is further studied to see 
whether there is any theory behind (Perry and Bodkin, 
2000). 
4·3 Coding of annual reports 
For the coding of the annual reports for content 
analysis, a sample of AIM annual reports is selected. 
The number of annual reports selected is not a priori 
decision. As Glasser and Strauss (1967) and Ahuvia 
(200 I) explain, last annual report to be coded would be 
decided when only the coder gets an understanding of 
the emerging pattern of the data and the picture. When 
there are two or more coders, it is essential to see the 
inter-coder agreement (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
However, when there is only one coder as found in this 
research, Ahuvia (200 I) and Milne and Adler (1999) 
explain that the researcher should have the theoretical 
knowledge to gain theoretical saturation and the 
development of the coding instrument, which could be 
considered to show the theoretical knowledge and 
sensitivity in the subject. Location of sentences in the 
annual reports and coding rules applicable to current 
study are presented below. 
4·4 Location of the sentences: 
Berg (2004) emphasises the need to look across the 
document to identify the themes needed for the 
analysis. 'Themes may be located in a variety of places 
in most written documents, it becomes necessary to 
specify in advance which places will be searched' 
(Berg, 2004, p.273). Thus the page or the section of the 
document or 'location in report' (Milne and Adler, 
1999) is identified before the proper coding takes place. 
We examined a number of sections as highlighted 
below from 75 annual reports to prepare the coding 
instrument and to select the location of the themes of 
the coding instrument in the annual reports. The 
selected sections include Chair's statement, CEOs 
statement/review, Corporate governance report, 
Directors' details, and Directors' report. 
4·5 Coding decision rules 
Milne and Adler (1999) and Beattie, Mcinnes and 
Feamley (2004) point out the need for developing 
coding rules in order to make the coding instrument and 
coding process reliable and valid. Following decision 
rules are developed for the coding process of the annual 
reports of the AIM companies: 
(1) The objective is to identify the role ofNEDs. 
(2) Selection of annual reports 
Annual reports of AIM companies are chosen 
irrespective of the sector. Number of annual reports or 
the sections selected is not a priori decision. It will 
depend on the theoretical saturation or sensitivity 
explained earlier. 
(3) Coding process - basic rules, specific rules and 
exclusion rules 
Basic rules of coding are as follows: 
(a) Unit of analysis is the sentence. A conceptual 
term should reside in the sentence selected 
otherwise the sentence is excluded protecting the 
two properties explained earlier (mutual 
exclusiveness and mutual exhaustiveness). 
, " 
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(b) Following locations in an annual report are 
coded: (a) Chairman's statement (b) Chief 
Executive Officer's report (c) Corporate 
Governance report; (d) Directors' details or 
biographies report and (e) Directors' report. 
(c) The paragraph number and the location of the 
sentence is entered in the database in order to 
enable constant comparison (Denscombe, 2003), 
that is going backward and forward in the 
document to ensure mutual exclusiveness and 
exhaustiveness explained earlier. 
Specific rules: Following questions are asked before the 
coding process begins. 
(a) Does the sentence mention the words Non 
Executive Directors (NEDs)? 
(b) Does it have an identifiable outcome and who 
claim it? NED or board? 
(c) If the word NED does not appear, does the word 
'Board' or the phrase 'Board of Directors' 
appear? 
(d) If the above criteria fulfils, does the board has 
NEDs? 
Exclusion rules on coding are as follows: 
(a) Sentences which start with the words 'We' and 
'Our' are excluded. Top management which 
include NEDs take decisions jointly (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). The context (Johns, 2001) of 
the sentence is evaluated. 
(b) Within the annual reports, corporate governance 
report and the directors' report, the statutory 
responsibilities of the directors as per the 
Companies Act (2006) have been indicated. If a 
sentence says anything other than these statutory 
responsibilities such as the maintenance of the 
web site, it will be considered as a contribution 
of the NEDs. As such, the sentence is 
considered for coding. 
4.6 Bases of interpretation of coded data: 
Contingency tables (Rose and Sullivan, 1998) or 
frequency analysis is the popular method of data 
tabulation interpretation of content analysts (Farrell and 
Cobbin, 1996; Perry and Bodkin, 2000, Jun and Cai, 
2001, Harris and Attour, 2003; Beattie, Mcinnes and 
Feamley 2004). This paper also follows the 
methodological insights of the above papers namely, the 
preparation of cross tabulated data tables and frequency 
analysis. 
2 .. 
This research paper uses X test " (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003) to see how close the observed 
frequencies are to the expected frequencies. We find 
that it appropriate to use this test because the coding of 
the annual reports generates only categorical data. 
Number of pre-requisites are required in order to 
calculate the x2 (Cooper and Schindler, 2003): (1) 
content analysis data should be from a sample of a 
population which is assumed to be randomly 
distributed; (2) categorical data must be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive; (3) data must be reported in 
frequencies not in percentages; (4) there should not be 
any cells with zero frequency and (5) expected 
frequencies below five should not compose more than 
twenty per cent of the cells. 
Muhr (1991, p. 358) argues that the insignificant 
frequencies could either be deleted, amalgamated or 
redefined. 'Codes and memos that have already been 
delineated can be renamed, deleted, uncoupled from 
codes or redefined by simply re-selecting them'. 
However, uncoupling or collapsing of the categories 
should avoid any loss of the significance of the data. 
The removal of the less frequent categories ensures the 
application of the X 
2 
but could damage the picture to 
emerge. However, Cooper and Schindler (2003) point 
out that if there is a significant difference between the 
observed and expected values, it is required to identify 
those cells and reasons behind the differences. 
4·7 Content analysis schedule 
In order to understand the nature of implementation of 
the provisions of the FRC (2006), that is separation of 
chair and the CEO role, appointment of sub-
committees of the board and appointment of NEDs, 
annual reports that are coded are used to get answers for 
the following questions: (1) How many directors are in 
the company? (2) How many of them are NEDs? (3) 
What is the title of the Chair? (4) How many sub 
committees of the board operate? These questions could 
be included in a content analysis schedule (Jauch, 
Osborn and Martin ( 1980, pp.524-525). Many authors 
use annual reports to find out the extent of 
implementation of the codes on corporate governance in 
listed companies but do not strictly follow the content 
analysis rules (Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002; 
Pass, 2004). With the insights gained through the above 
methodological approaches, the next section presents 
the results of our analysis. 
5 Analysis and results 
Our analysis is based on information presented in 75 
annual reports. Since the coding of the number of 
annual reports were decided when the researchers 
gained an understanding of the emerging pattern of the 
role of NEDs, the number of annual reports used to get 
" ® 
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the understanding of the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the AIM companies were limited to the 
same number of annual reports (75). Although this may 
not be a representative sample of the total number of 
AIM companies (about 1076 as at December 2012), the 
following data still reflect an important picture with 
regard to the degree of voluntary acceptance of the 
principles and provisions of Code on Corporate 
Governance. Appointment of the NEDs as chairs, 
number ofNEDs and acceptance of the sub committees 
of the board are some examples we have found in this 
study. 
5.1 Corporate Governance variables: type of 
chair, number ofNEDs and sub committees 
Table I shows that the AIM companies use three 
different titles beneath the statement of the chairman in 
the annual reports coded: Executive chair (22. 7 per 
cent) non-executive chair (52 per cent) and chairman 
(25.3 per cent). The annual reports which do not specifY 
beneath the statement of chair whether the chair is an 
executive or non-executive director belong to the 
category of chairman. However, a closer look at the 
bibliography page ofthe board members and in relation 
to the chair, it is found that the chair is classified either 
as executive chair or non-executive chair. However, 
whether the NED chair meets the criteria of 
independence (Higgs, 2003) could be judged by seeing 
whether the particular NED chair has shares and any 
other interests in the company. Our finding shows that 
majority of the NED chairs of AIM companies have 
shares in the companies they work and not truly 
independent as the NED chairs of FTSE I 00 
companies. 
Table 2 shows that vast majority of companies (92 
per cent) appoint NEDs. There are no NEDs at present 
in six companies (8 per cent). Thirty two percent of 
companies (24) have two NEDs. There are twenty two 
firms (29 per cent) with three NEDs. While there is 
only one company with five NEDs, eleven companies 
have four NEDs each. This picture shows a remarkable 
acceptance of the significant role present and role of 
NEDs. 
Table 3 shows that the audit and remuneration 
committees are more established units for about 74 per 
cent of companies. It also shows that the nomination 
committees ( 41 per cent) are still to develop as a whole. 
However, there is no clear term of reference for the sub 
committees in the AIM listed firms as applicable for the 
FTSE 100 companies. Interestingly, it is found that 35 
per cent of companies have all three sub-committees. 
There are at least two committees in about 33 percent of 
companies. More importantly, almost one fourth of 
companies have no a single sub-committee in the board. 
This is also compatible with the non-availability of a 
single NED in 8 per cent of companies (Table 2). The 
degree of significance given for the sub-committees 
varies among the firms. This could be due to the firm 
specific factors such as the stage of growth of the 
company, appraisal of cost and benefit of sub-
committees, growth of the market and so on. 
The significance of existence of sub-committees in 
corporate governance could be a reflection of vigilant 
corporate governance at the expense of the vital 
strategic role of the NEDs (e.g. Taylor, 2004 ). 
However, sub-committees could be an avenue for more 
discussions and sharing ideas among board members 
and also for polarisation of ideas and diversities if they 
are not matched properly (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) find that there are 
two types of board cultures namely maximalist and 
minimalist. Maximalist culture accommodates more 
discussions, listening, collaborative work and the 
minimalist boards are in the opposite side of these 
attributes. 
The evidence shows that there could be more 
vigilant corporate governance in AIM companies which 
are dominated by the NED chairs. For example, in 
Table 4, of the 1,220 sentences coded, 703 sentences 
(58.0 per cent of total sentences) are in the coded 
annual reports where there are NED chairs. There are 
245 sentences coded (20.1 per cent) in the annual 
reports reflecting executive chairs. In the unclassified 
chairman category, there are 272 sentences coded (23.9 
per cent). Thus, the number of sentences in the annual 
reports coded with the presence ofNED chairs could be 
used as a proxy for more vigilance corporate 
governance. 
This picture is further supported by the 
information presented in Table 5. Table 5 shows that 
when the number of NEDs in a board is two 34.8 per 
cent (with 425 sentences) and 
30.1 per cent (with 367 sentences) of the coded 
sentences are found respectively. A remarkable feature 
is that when there are more than 4 NEDs in a board, the 
number of coded sentences remains low. A number of 
previous researchers point out that when there are more 
than the required number of NEDs, board deliberations 
are difficult and virtually collapse the board level of 
discussions (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003). However, this possibility has to be 
verified with empirical research as the required number 
may vary according to the complexity of other aspects 
of firms. 
5.2 Characteristics of the roles ofNEDs 
Content analysis data shows at least four major 
characteristics of the roles ofthe NEDs. 
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5.2.1 Characteristic 1: Multiplicity of roles 
Multiplicity of the tasks is the major feature found in 
relation to the roles of the NEDs, which is reflected by 
existence of a relatively large number of tasks. Table 4 
shows that the result of the content analysis indicates 37 
tasks of the NEDs. Cognitive tasks are explained in 
theory but there is lack of empirical evidence in relation 
to board research (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Haleblian 
and Rajagopalan, 2006). This survey finds number of 
cognitive tasks of the NEDs such as beliefs (2.7 per 
cent or just 33 sentences), considerations (2.4 per cent 
or 25 sentences) and expectations (1.9 per cent or 23 
sentences). Beliefs make a vital function among many 
stakeholders in large organisations (Steiner and 
Edmunds, 1979). Beliefs created among the minds of 
the stakeholders by the board or beliefs of boards are 
important to develop the morale of the management and 
employees. Gist ( 1987) explains that the beliefs guide 
many actions such as recruitment, setting of goals for 
the corporation and motivation of employees. Such 
beliefs are one of the decisive factors of job satisfaction 
(Brief and Aldag, 1981 ). Design and development of 
criteria to evaluate the board performance and 
recruitment of the directors is vital to protect interests 
of the stakeholders as explained by Useem (2003) who 
points out the lack of such criteria reflects in the failed 
giant corporations in the US. Interestingly, the issue of 
whether there is an evaluation of the performance of 
both the NEDs and executive directors counts for only 
just close to I per cent of sentences (II sentences) 
coded. This finding is consistent with Higgs's (2003) 
finding that the evaluation is one of the least considered 
board tasks. Our analysis also shows the less 
significance role of criteria development for managerial 
decision making ( l.O per cent). Useem (2003) also 
pointed out that criteria development for the managerial 
decisions and for the board tasks is one of the most 
needed but forgotten task of boards. 
5.2.2 Characteristic 2: Differences in roles according 
to the type of chair 
In order to understand the relative significance of each 
category of roles according to the type of chair, we 
decided an arbitrary value to judge the most significant 
role categories for a chair (as 5 per cent of coded 
sentences or above). Accordingly, Table 5 shows that 
some role categories are more significant for some type 
of chairmen. For example, the NED chair considers 
organisation (11.5 per cent), responsibilities (9.3 per 
cent), revisions (9.1 per cent), meetings (8.8 per cent), 
approvals (7.3 per cent), studying information (6.6 per 
cent), recommendations (6.3 per cent) and 
considerations (5.6 per cent) as relatively significant 
roles. When we apply the same rule for the executive 
chair, we could identify meetings (12.7 per cent), 
organisation (11.2 per cent), responsibilities (10.7 per 
cent), revisions (8.3 per cent) and approvals (6.3 per 
cent) as important roles among other categories. Within 
the unclassified chair, responsibilities (10.8 per cent), 
revisions (10.3 per cent), meetings (9.9 per cent), 
organisation (9.4 per cent), approvals (8.1 per cent) and 
monitoring (7.6 per cent) take higher values according 
to the above 5 per cent rule. Across all the chairs, 
several categories such as organising the tasks of the 
board, meetings, responsibilities, revisions and 
approvals are more important than other roles. 
5.2.3 Characteristic 3: Variation within roles in Role 
Engagement 
Variations in relation to ways of engagement in above 
roles NEDs are noted under this characteristic. For 
example, the task in relation to strategy has many 
variations of engagement such as planning, approval, 
revision and so on. Stiles (2001) also found such variety 
of tasks in relation to strategy. In particular, he 
identified that revision, approvals, monitoring as sub 
parts of the process of strategy. The result of our 
analysis presented in Table 5 also indicates a member 
of such roles such as monitoring, revisions, and 
approval . 
5.2.4 Characteristic 4: Identification of the Gate 
Keeper role 
This survey supports the Gate Keeper role of the NEDs 
(e.g. Kirkbride and Letza, 2005). Accordingly, 
preparation of the terms of reference of the NEDs and 
appointment of the sub committees of the board such as 
the audit, remuneration and nomination committee 
could be considered as strengthening the Gate Keeper 
role of the NEDs. Some excerpts from the annual 
reports coded to support these roles are: 'The directors 
intend to strengthen the Board through the appointment 
of at least one new non-executive director' (LP A 
Group, Annual Report, 2006, p,4). 'The directors have 
established audit Nomination and remuneration 
committees with formally delegated rules and 
responsibilities. Each of the committees currently 
comprises the non-executive directors' (Celoxica 
Annual Report: 2006, p.15). 
5·3 Validity and reliability of content 
analysis 
The aim of the Chi Square statistical test was to see 
whether the coded data is randomly distributed ensuring 
mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the 
categories. As explained earlier, categories which have 
5 or less than 5 frequencies are removed to calculate the 
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expectancy values (Cooper and Schindler, 2003). 
Accordingly, the total number of sentences remained 
883 from the initial number of 1,220 sentences (Table 
6). Table 6 shows the calculated expected values. The 
difference between the observed and the expected 
values (residual values) is only a matter for further 
analysis when there is a significant difference between 
the two. 
Accordingly, the calculated Chi Square value is 
16.85 with the degree of freedom of 26. The table value 
for degree of freedom of 26 with the 0.05 confidence 
level is 38.85. As the calculated value is less than the 
table value, null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The 
independence between the variables is indicated. On the 
other hand, it means that each category has its' own 
independent distribution with the protection of the 
properties in content analysis, that is mutual 
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. This signifies that 
the content analysis data is randomly distributed. A 
discussion on the relationship between these variable is 
presented below under discussion. 
6 Discussion 
We found that NEDs play not only just number of roles, 
but also engage in various tasks and cognitive roles as 
well. When considering all these as a whole, they 
represent such characteristics as multiplicity of roles, 
role differentiation by the type of chair, variation within 
roles in role engagement, and the existence of the gate-
keeper role. In the theoretical section of this study, we 
emphasized the value of role theory. As such, we 
discuss our findings in relation to the assertion of role 
senders or stakeholders' expectations in identifYing and 
discussing roles of NEDs. In addition, the result of 
content analysis has provided us with the opportunity to 
evaluate the weight of corporate governance roles and 
strategic roles and making a 'rough hypotheses' (Berg, 
2004:283) about the relative importance of the roles of 
NEDs of surveyed companies. 
6.1 Identification and meeting of 
expectations of several stakeholders 
Within the multiple numbers of tasks, it is possible to 
identify that NEDs play a variety of roles to meet the 
expectations of several role senders such as the 
shareholders, CEO and regulatory authorities. Some of 
these tasks could meet the expectations of several role 
senders simultaneously. For example, the tasks of 
meetings (9.8 per cent), communication (3.l per cent), 
beliefs (4.3 per cent) and expectations (3.5 per cent) 
could meet the needs of shareholders, CEO and 
'regulatory authorities' (Jones and Pollit, 2003), such as 
Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2006) and Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC, 2006). 
6.2 More emphasis on corporate 
governance than the strategic direction 
The content analysis gives the opportunity to 
understand vital aspects of corporate governance 
emerging in the context of the enhanced emphasis of 
the role of NEDs (Gnan et al., 2013; Al-Najjar, 2014; 
FRC, 2006). The finding of the existence ofNED chair 
and the sub committees of boards could be considered 
as more attentive compliance for corporate governance. 
This is rather consistent with Pettigrew and McNulty's 
( 1995) finding that boards which give equal chance for 
the directors to discuss or make their points heard by 
the others, have more independent directors. They 
further emphasized that such boards involve in more 
corporate governance roles than the boards with more 
executive directors. 
However, paying more attention on corporate 
governance could lead to less attention on the 
entrepreneurial activities of the companies. Strategic 
contribution and entrepreneurial role are pointed out as 
key aspects of NEDs' roles (FRC, 2006). Chambers 
(2005) argues that 'many directors will concur with the 
sentiment that a greater proportion of their available 
time is now taken up with accountability, audit, risk 
management and control matters than was historically 
the case' (p:28). The roles we found in our content 
analysis also indicate that organisation, meetings, and 
responsibilities take a higher value than the areas 
covered under the theme 'strategy'. Therefore, 
corporate governance roles tend to overrides strategic 
direction of the firms represented in this study. 
Therefore, the survey could build a 'Rough hypothesis' 
(Berg, 2004, p. :283) that greater the tendency towards 
NEDs playing more important roles in boards, higher 
the possibility ofNEDs' involvement in more corporate 
governance role than strategic roles. 
6.3 Identification of independent and 
dependent relationship between roles 
Using the Chi Square test we performed, we could also 
develop a 'rough hypothesis' (Berg, 2004:283) that 
there is a relationship between the cognitive aspects of 
the NEDs and the extent of involvement in such roles as 
strategic, advisory, monitoring, criteria development, 
evaluation, and leadership. Logical concepts could be 
related to each other in the context of discussion 
(Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1979). Thus, the Figure 1 
shows the mapping of the relationship between 
cognitive tasks and the more manifest variables such as 
strategy, advice and monitoring in the context of the 
tasks of the NEDs found in this survey. Straight lines 
show the direct relationship between the cognitive 
tasks. Dashed lines show that the cognitive tasks 
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themselves are moderated by the manifest tasks or the 
results brought by the particular action in relation to 
strategy, monitoring and advice. Therefore, there is 
action and reaction relationship between cognitive tasks 
and key roles ofNEDs. 
Figure l. Testable relationships between cognitive Tasks and Key NED roles 
Beliefs Strategy 
Expectations Advice 
Considerations Monitoring 
Key: relationship 
+------- --
This drawing is a result of logical 
reasoning (Reynolds, 1971; Toulmin, 
Rieke and Janik, 1979) and mental 
mapping (Farrand, Hussain and 
Hennessy, 2002), based on the results of 
content analysis. 
7 Conclusion and recommendations 
Indirect 
We aimed at exploring the roles of NEDs in 
implementing NRCCG in SMEs and examining their 
characteristics and relationships by adopting content 
analysis of annual reports. The findings revealed that 
NEDs perform a multiple number of roles, tasks and 
cognitive functions to meet the expectation of several 
stakeholders simultaneously, such as the CEO, 
regulatory authorities, and shareholders. This reflects 
the fact that NEDs are a special kind of bees in the bee 
hive of board. Therefore, for proper understanding of 
roles of NEDs in SMEs, researchers may consider all 
these roles, tasks, and functions as an integrative system 
(e.g. Gnan et al., 2013). As such, the realities ofNEDs 
role of SMEs cannot be understood by relying only on 
quantitative analysis and summarised roles. The content 
analysis methodology we adopted provided us with the 
direct 
opportunity to use quantitative, qualitative and 
descriptive information for exploring the realities of 
NEDs roles in SMEs. For example, when NEDs play 
their roles in a situation where the implementation of 
NRCCG is not compulsory, cognitive functions such as 
positive attitudes, appropriate beliefs and considerations 
are found to be important as they are associated NEDs 
key roles such as advice, strategy, and monitoring. Such 
explanation cannot be made by relying only on 
quantitative and summarised information presented 
Table 6. As such, the possibility of looking at the issue 
from different perspective is another advantage of the 
content analysis approach adopted in this study. 
Accordingly, we found that tasks can be identified as 
dimensions of roles. This view of NEDs role is 
consistent with previous research findings as well. For 
example, a number of previous studies have indicated 
and have indicated that tasks can be identified not only 
as just roles but also as specific roles (Gnan et al., 2013; 
Sciascia et al., 2013; Heuvel, Oils and Voordeckers, 
2006). Another key finding of this study is that the role 
of NEDs is conditioned by NEDs own cognitive tasks 
such as beliefs, assumptions and expectations of NEDs 
and by the expectations of the stakeholders. One of the 
implications of this finding is that NEDs and CEOs of 
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SMEs can use these insights in the formation of 
expectation on job descriptions and person 
specifications relevant to recruitment, training & 
development, and performance management purposes. 
This study also provides ample insights into the 
adoption of content analysis on exploring roles of 
boards and actions in corporate boards by using 
information recorded in annual reports. Further research 
is required to understand the distinctive processes 
involved in each tasks identified. For examples, roles 
such as recommendation, decision making, approval 
etc. have their own processes despite the fact that they 
contain closely related meaning. Such process studies 
are yet to come into the reality of board work (Gnan et 
al., 20 13; Pettigrew, 1997). Further, based on 
quantitative, qualitative and descriptive information 
presented in this study, we could also develop a model 
depicting conceptual and testable relationships between 
cognitive tasks and key roles of NEDs for future 
studies. As indicated in a number of previous 
researches, this study reflects the difficulty of 
developing a general theory on the role of NEDs to 
satisfY the expectations of stakeholders such as the 
CEO, shareholders, and regulatory authorities due to a 
number of limitations. First, researchers have largely 
focused on the role of NEDs in AIM companies. 
Therefore, the results could be more of relevance to the 
AIM companies. Second, selection of a set of annual 
reports for the content analysis was done on a random 
basis from the annual reports collected from the Annual 
Report Service in the UK. Third, declarations of annual 
reports are assumed to be true despite the fact that there 
are arguments on the accuracy of information (Atkinson 
and offey, 2004, Abeysckera, 2006). However, X2 test 
analysis of this study proved the randomisation of the 
categories in the content analysis. Therefore, it is an 
assurance of the reliability of the content analysis. 
Fourth, when there are semantic differences, 
understanding the meaning of a particular term could 
become difficult. This might be addressed in future 
studies by selecting methodologies that support looking 
at issues from different perspectives. 
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Appendices 
Table 1. Type of chair 
Number of firms 
19 
17 
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75 
Table 2. Number ofNEDs 
Number of firms Per cent 
6 8.0 
11 14.7 
24 32.0 
22 29.3 
11 14.7 
I l.3 
75 100.0 
Table 3: Sub committees of the board 
Number of firms 
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Per cent 
25.3 
22.7 
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Table 6. Calculated expected values for Chi Square test 
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Count 39 50 15 13 12 6 10 10 7 15 12 6 272 
Expected Count 49.3 42.6 17.2 14.9 7.4 5.1 11.4 14.5 4.9 12 10.7 6.5 272 
%within Chairmanship 14% 18% 6% 5% 4% 2% 4% 4% 3% 6% 4% 2% 100.00% 
21 
% within Category 18% 26% 20% 19% 36% 26% 20% 15% 32% 28% 25% % 22.3% 
%ofTota1 3% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 22% 
Count 48 46 17 10 6 6 17 11 6 9 7 7 245 
Expected Count 44.4 38.4 15.5 13.5 6.6 4.6 10.2 13.1 4.4 10.8 9.6 5.8 245 
% within Chairmanship 20% 19% 7% 4% 2% 2% 7% 5% 2% 4% 3% 3% 100% 
24 
% within Cateaory 22% 24% 22% 15% 18% 26% 33% 17% 27% 17% 15% % 20% 
%ofTotal 4% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 20% 
Count 134 95 45 44 15 11 24 44 9 30 29 16 703 
16. 
Expected Count 127.3 110.1 44.4 38.6 19 13.3 29.4 37.5 12.7 31.1 27.7 7 703 
%within Chairmanship 19% 14% 6% 6% 2% 2% 3% 6% 1% 4% 4% 2% 100% 
55 
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Count 221 191 77 67 33 23 51 65 22 54 48 29 1220 
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.00 
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Table 7: Chi-Square tests 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 112.299a 72 0.002 
Likelihood Ratio 117.293 72 0.001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 0.835 1 0.361 
N of Valid Cases 1220 
a 51 cells (45.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20. 
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